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How Useful Are Forecasts
Of Corporate Profits?
Dean Croushore*
Investors’ forecasts of corporate profits affect
the prices of corporate stock.  When a corpora-
tion announces that earnings won’t be as large
as expected, its stock price immediately drops.
Similarly, when investors think a firm will earn
higher profits than they previously thought, the
company’s stock rises in value. This positive re-
lationship between forecasts of corporate prof-
its and stock prices must be true for the stock
market as a whole. That is, if investors forecast
higher overall corporate earnings, that should
lead to higher overall stock prices.  In the 1990s,
stock prices have grown substantially, in part
because of forecasts of higher levels of corporate
profits.1  But how accurate are those forecasts?
To investigate the accuracy of forecasts of over-
all U.S. corporate profits, we need to have a con-
sistent set of forecasts. One such set comes from
*Dean Croushore is an assistant vice president and
economist in the Research Department of the Philadel-
phia Fed. He’s also head of the department’s macroeco-
nomics section. Dean thanks John Duca of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas for comments on an earlier draft
of this article.
1For a discussion of how stock prices are related to
corporate profitability in the 1990s, see the article by
John Cochrane and the article by John Carlson and Kevin
Sargent. U.S. data show strong correlations between stock
prices, corporate profits, and forecasts of corporate prof-
its.
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the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF),
which has collected forecasts of corporate prof-
its and many other macroeconomic variables for
over 30 years.  The survey is widely respected by
academic researchers, and they often use it for
investigating the quality of forecasts of various
macroeconomic variables, especially inflation.2
In general, the forecasters who participate in the
survey are actively involved in forecasting as a
part of their jobs. The forecasters include many
Wall Street economists, along with chief econo-
mists at Fortune 500 companies, a number of
bank economists, and some economic consult-
ants. It’s the type of group you’d expect to have a
pretty good idea about corporate profits as well
as the macroeconomic variables (such as infla-
tion and output growth) they are asked to fore-
cast.
DATA PROBLEMS
If we look at the raw data on the growth of
corporate profits in the U.S. economy, we see that
profits are very volatile over time (Figure 1).3  No-
tice that, on an annualized basis, corporate prof-
its have occasionally risen from one quarter to
the next at a rate of over 100 percent. Data on
most macroeconomic variables, such as the
economy’s output or its industrial production,
aren’t nearly as volatile. To eliminate some of
the volatility, we’ll look at the growth in corpo-
rate profits over a year, not at quarterly data.4
The annual data series is a lot less volatile.
Unfortunately, attempts to analyze the fore-
casts of the growth of corporate profits are sub-
ject to a problem that’s also true of many other
variables — the data have been modified over
time. That is, the data a forecaster or stockholder
faced at a particular point in time look quite dif-
ferent from the data available today.
For example, let’s take a look at the reported
values for the growth of corporate profits from
1986 to 1987.  If we look at the national income
data in May 1988, the growth rate of corporate
profits from 1986 to 1987 was reported as 8.5
percent. In July 1988, the numbers underwent a
minor revision, and the growth rate rose to 10.2
percent. But in July 1989, new IRS tabulations of
data from corporate tax returns led the Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA), the statistical
2For a look at some of the details
of the survey and how it’s run, see
my 1993 article; to find out how ac-
curate the inflation forecasts from the
survey are, see my 1996 article.  I use
the SPF, rather than the Blue Chip
survey or the IBES survey, because it
began in 1968, much earlier than the
other surveys.
3The precise variable we’re exam-
ining is nominal (i.e., not adjusted
for inflation) after-tax corporate prof-
its (without inventory valuation and
capital consumption adjustments)
as reported in the Survey of Current
Business from the national income
and product accounts.
FIGURE 1
Quarterly Corporate-Profits Growth
4The variable we’ll use is the growth rate in the annual
average level of corporate profits from one year to the
next.
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agency that compiles the national income ac-
counts, to substantially reduce the value of cor-
porate profits for both 1986 and 1987, but more
so for 1986.  As a result, the growth rate of corpo-
rate profits from 1986 to 1987 rose to 23.2 per-
cent.
An even bigger change came in December
1991, when the BEA, among other changes, re-
classified the bad-debt losses of financial insti-
tutions as financial transactions; those losses
were no longer included in the national income
accounts and were not to be viewed as reducing
corporate profits. The result was a very large re-
calculation of corporate profits, especially for
1987, when financial firms recorded very large
bad-debt losses.  The impact was to increase the
growth rate of corporate profits for 1987 to 44.4
percent.  Minor revisions since then have re-
duced the growth rate to 43.5 percent.
So, occasionally the data for corporate profits
are revised quite extensively.  Most of the time,
the revisions aren’t as extensive as they were for
1987, but they can still be substantial.
Getting around this problem of data revisions
is not easy. We’re going to attempt to do so using
the following technique:  we’re
going to take data sets that
were created not long after the
forecasts were formulated, be-
cause information available at
that time is what affected stock
prices.  First, we’ve created a
special set of data, called a real-
time data set.5  Based on data
published in the Survey of Cur-
rent Business from 1965 to the
present, this data set contains
the data available to a fore-
caster in mid-November each
year, the same time at which the
Survey of Professional Forecasters is taken.  These
data sets show us what the official data looked
like at the time.  This real-time data set is a better
source for the numbers forecasters were trying
to predict than the data set available today, be-
cause some of the changes in corporate-profits
data involved redefinitions of the items included
in corporate profits; forecasters couldn’t have
foreseen those changes.
How well do the year-ahead forecasts com-
pare to the data, using the real-time data set?  To
find out, we’ll first plot the forecast for the growth
of corporate profits over a one-year period, then
compare it to the actual value in the real-time
data set (Figure 2).6  You can see that the fore-
casts and actual growth rates move together
FIGURE 2
Corporate Profits
(SPF Forecasts and Real-Time Actuals)
5Details on this data set can be
found in my 1999 paper with Tom
Stark.
6The forecasts are taken from the November Survey
of Professional Forecasters each year, from 1968 to 1996.
The forecast variable is the growth rate of corporate prof-
its from the year in which the survey was taken to the
following year, based on annual average data. For ex-
ample, the November 1968 survey forecasts how much
higher profits are expected to be in 1969 than they were
in 1968.
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pretty well in the 1970s, despite the oil-price
shocks in that period. Overall, the forecasts were
not too bad in the 1980s.  The forecasters missed
the downturn in profits from 1980 to 1982, and
their forecasts didn’t capture the volatility in
profits in the late 1980s, but they did get the av-
erage about right. Forecasts in the 1990s haven’t
been too bad either; they were just a bit too pessi-
mistic about the growth of profits from 1994 to
1997.
Another way to see the relationship between
the forecasts and the real-time actual data is to
use a scatter plot that compares the actual data
with the forecasts (Figure 3). If the forecasts are
accurate, the points in the scatter plot should lie
along the 45-degree line shown in the figure.  A
data point close to that 45-degree line means that
the growth rate being forecast is close to the ac-
tual growth rate of corporate profits. The further
away a point is from the 45-degree line, the greater
the error and the poorer the forecast.
From the scatter plot, it looks like the fore-
casts for the growth rate of corporate profits are
pretty good. The data points are close to the 45-
degree line, with a few exceptions, which means
the forecast errors are usually fairly small.
STATISTICAL TESTS
FOR FORECAST QUALITY
Although examining figures that plot the fore-
casts along with the actual values is interesting
and graphically illustrates how good the fore-
casts are, we can also use statistical theory to
perform more formal tests of the quality of the
forecasts. Economists have developed a number
of tests that forecasts must pass to be considered
high quality.
All of the tests that follow look at the relation-
ship between the forecasts and the actual values
and allow for the fact that no forecast is perfect.
After all, the economy is very difficult to predict,
and many things can cause a forecast to go awry.
We’re going to look at two different ideas about
forecast quality: (1) high-quality forecasts should
be rational, and (2) high-quality forecasts should
be better than simple alternatives.
A forecast is said to be ratio-
nal when forecast errors are not
predictable in advance.  If they
were, it would be possible to
create a better forecast. For ex-
ample, if I knew that the fore-
casters, on average, predicted
a growth rate of corporate prof-
its that was three percentage
points too high, I could make a
better forecast by taking the
survey’s prediction and sub-
tracting three percentage
points.  For a forecast to be con-
sidered rational, no such
method of changing a forecast
must lead to a better forecast.
The second test of forecast
quality is a forecast’s ability to
beat simple alternative fore-
casts.  We should expect fore-
casts from our survey to be sig-
FIGURE 3
Corporate Profits
(SPF Forecasts and Real-Time Actuals)
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nificantly better (in the sense of having smaller
errors) than some simple alternative methods of
forecasting. For example, suppose we found that
the forecast errors from the Survey of Professional
Forecasters were larger, on average, than the er-
rors from a forecast that assumes corporate profit
growth will be 10 percent every year. Then we’d
think, with good reason, that the survey’s fore-
cast was poor because it was worse than a naive
forecast.
We begin by testing to see if the survey fore-
casts are rational. We need statistical theory in
these tests because, as noted above, there will
always be errors in forecasts. The statistical ques-
tion is:  are the forecast errors unpredictable
enough that we should consider the forecasts
rational?  Or are they so predictable that we
should reject the notion of rationality for the fore-
casts?  The average error in the forecasts for the
growth rate of corporate profits was one percent-
age point.  But in this case, the one-percentage-
point average error is not statistically significant,
because the growth rate of corporate profits is so
variable from year to year that finding a one-
percentage-point error isn’t surprising or un-
usual. So one could not convincingly argue that
the forecasts aren’t rational
just because on average they
are slightly higher than ac-
tual growth of profits.
A common statistical test
for rationality is a test for
unbiasedness, which uses a
technique known as regres-
sion analysis.  The regression
analysis determines whether
the points lie along the 45-
degree line in the scatter plot
(Figure 3).7  In this case, the
test doesn’t reject the hypoth-
esis that the forecasts are un-
biased; visually, there is a
rough balance between the
points below the 45-degree
line and those above.  This
result suggests that the forecasts are potentially
useful and can’t be easily improved upon.
If we look at a plot of the forecast errors (the
actual value for the growth rate of corporate prof-
its minus the forecast at each date), we see they
are occasionally large (Figure 4).  But the fore-
cast errors don’t show any predictable pattern,
which means it would be difficult for someone
to make a better forecast than the one provided
by the survey forecasters.
FIGURE 4
SPF Corporate Profit Forecast Errors
(Real-Time Actuals)
7To perform this test, we regress the actual value for
corporate-profits growth each year on a constant and the
forecast value. If the forecast were perfect, the constant
term would be zero, and the coefficient on the forecast
would be one. But, of course, there are certain to be some
errors in the forecasts, which cause the coefficients to
differ from zero and one, so we must use statistical
theory to see how different from zero and one the coeffi-
cients are. Thus, we run a statistical test to see whether
the constant term is significantly different from zero and
the coefficient on the forecast is statistically different
from one. If they are significantly different from zero and
one, we say the forecast isn’t rational. Our tests show
they are not significantly different from zero and one.
Further details on the statistical tests in this article can be
found in the Appendix.
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A variety of statistical tests that examine the
forecasts show the forecast errors to be unpre-
dictable and balanced, a sign of good-quality
forecasts.  The various tests run on the forecasts
include the sign test, which examines whether
there are the same number of positive and nega-
tive forecast errors; the Wilcoxon signed-rank test,
which examines whether the magnitude of posi-
tive and negative forecast errors are the same;
the zero-mean test, which examines whether the
forecast errors are significantly different from
zero; and the Dufour test, which looks to see if
the forecast error for one year is independent of
the forecast error from the previous year.  The
forecasts pass all these tests with flying colors
(Table 1).8  The table provides the value of the test
statistic, along with the critical value to which
that test statistic is to be compared, and whether
the test supports the rationality of the forecasts.
If the value of the test statistic is less than the
critical value, the test supports the notion that
the forecasts are rational.9
In summary, all the tests support the view that
the forecasts of corporate-profits growth from the
Survey of Professional Forecasters are rational.
The second type of test for forecast quality
compares the forecasts from the survey to some
alternative forecasts.  One alternative is to form
a naive forecast, in which the forecast for next
year’s growth rate of profits equals the value
from last year.  Another possibility is to forecast
that corporate-profits growth equals its long-run
average. Yet another possibility is to assume that
corporate-profits growth simply equals its aver-
age over the last five years. When we try these
alternatives, however, the errors are always much
worse than the errors from the survey forecasts.
A good summary measure of overall forecast
accuracy is the root mean squared error of the
forecast.10  When we look at the root mean
squared error of the survey forecasts, compared
to the alternative forecasts, we see that the sur-
vey has a lower root mean squared error than
any of the alternatives (Table 2).
Although the survey
forecasts pass all these
statistical tests, we are left
wondering a bit about
these results, because the
forecast errors are some-
TABLE 1
Tests for Forecast Rationality
Test Value of Test Statistic    Critical Value      Rational?
Unbiasedness test 0.23 3.37 yes
Sign test 0.56 1.96 yes
Wilcoxon 0.07 1.96 yes
   signed-rank test
Zero-mean test 0.64 2.04 yes
Dufour test 1.32 1.96 yes
Note:  The test is consistent with rationality of the forecast when the value of
the test statistic is less than its critical value.
8The first line of the table reports the test results that
show the forecast is unbiased.  Additional information
about the other tests can be found in the Appendix.
9To see how the forecasts
would fare in these tests us-
ing today’s data, as opposed
to the real-time data set, see
Corporate Profits Data Today.
10The root mean squared
error is calculated by taking
the forecast errors at each
date, squaring them, adding
them together, dividing by the
number of data points, and
taking the square root.
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a variable this volatile is bound to lead to large
forecast errors, as we’ve seen. However, large
forecast errors don’t indicate that the forecasts
are bad, just that the variable itself is inherently
volatile.
WHY ARE CORPORATE PROFITS
SO VOLATILE?
The main source of volatility in corporate prof-
its seems to be the business cycle.  Recessions
cause corporate profits to decline substantially
(Figure 5).  As you can see from the figure, the
recessions (the shaded periods in the figure) that
began in 1969, 1973, 1980, 1981, and 1990 led to
significant declines in the growth rate of corpo-
rate profits.
Other sources of volatility in corporate prof-
its include:  (1) changes in the value of the dollar
against other currencies; (2) changes in the in-
Corporate Profits Data Today
How much difference would it make to use today’s data on corporate profits, instead of the real-
time data set used in this article?  The choice of which data to use makes a difference, especially at
particular dates. If we plot the data from today over time and compare it to the real-time data, we see
that the new definitions and recalculations of the data are important, especially at certain dates, such
as 1987 (Figure). The figure shows that
the difference in the growth rate of
corporate profits between the differ-
ent data sets is as much as 33 percent-
age points!
How much difference would this
have made to our statistical tests?
Using the latest vintage of the data
would increase the average forecast
error to three percentage points
(higher than the one-percentage-
point average error based on the real-
time data). Despite that, when we run
all the statistical tests reported in Table
1 and the alternative forecasts re-
ported in Table 2, using the latest data,
the forecasts still pass all the tests, but
not by as large a margin.
TABLE 2
Tests for Improving Forecasts
Alternative Root Mean
Squared Error
Survey 8.9
Naive 15.8
Constant Average Value 11.9
Five-Year Moving Average Value 13.5
Corporate Profits
(SPF Forecasts and Actuals)
times large.  It’s not clear why that should be the
case. But a close look at the data reveals a good
reason why the forecasts pass the tests despite
the occasional large errors:  corporate profits are
very volatile, as we saw in Figure 1. Forecasting
Date
10 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA
BUSINESS REVIEW SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1999
flation rate; and (3) changes in tax laws.
Changes in the value of the dollar against
other currencies can influence corporate profits,
since large corporations depend heavily on prof-
its from foreign operations, which are affected
by the exchange rate.  When the dollar rises
against foreign currencies, profits earned abroad
in foreign currencies convert to fewer dollars, so
the dollar profits of international corporations
decline.
Uncertainty about profits can also stem from
changes in the inflation rate.  Inflation introduces
a number of distortions into our accounting sys-
tems, and those systems can’t deal with infla-
tion perfectly. For example, the manner in which
accounting methods handle the value of inven-
tories can make a significant difference in nomi-
nal profits.  As a result of problems like this,
changes in the inflation rate make profits hard
to predict.11
Changes in tax law obviously influence after-
tax corporate profits, though sometimes the ef-
fects aren’t apparent for several years. Corpo-
rate taxes were cut in 1981, in the middle of a
recession, but the effects didn’t show up in cor-
porate profits until the
economy came out of the re-
cession in late 1982 and be-
gan growing strongly in
1983.12
SUMMARY
Corporate profits are
quite volatile. Even so, fore-
casts of corporate profits
from the Survey of Profes-
sional Forecasters pass a va-
riety of statistical tests that
show they’re rational and
better than simple alternative
forecasting methods. The
forecasts line up reasonably
well with actual values.
The value of the stock
market may have risen over
the past few years partly because of forecasts of
high corporate profits. The results reported here,
concerning the forecasts of corporate profits from
the Survey of Professional Forecasters, suggest
that such forecasts have been fairly accurate,
though certainly not perfect, over the last 30
years.
What is the forecast for corporate profits for
this year? In the Survey of Professional Forecast-
ers from the fourth quarter of 1998, the forecast-
ers projected that corporate profits would rise
just 0.8 percent in 1999, after declining in 1998.
This represents a significant slowdown from the
growth rate of corporate profits throughout the
earlier part of the 1990s.
FIGURE 5
Corporate Profits
(Real-Time Actuals)
11There is some controversy about this issue, since the
biggest increases in inflation were accompanied by large
increases in oil prices and economic recession. As a re-
sult, it’s hard to tell whether corporate profits really fall
because of inflation alone.
12For more on the sources of volatility in corporate
profits, see the article by John Duca.
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APPENDIX
For the interested reader, this appendix explains the tests discussed in this article in more detail (see
Table 1 in the text).  More information about all these tests can be found in the 1996 article by Diebold
and Lopez.
BIAS TESTS
The first test discussed in the paper is a test for unbiasedness.  A set of forecasts over time is unbiased
if a regression of the actual values (the dependent variable) on a constant term and the forecasted
values (the independent variable) yields coefficients that are not significantly different from 0 for the
constant term and 1 for the forecast term.  That is, the regression is:
pt = a + b pt
f + et,
where pt is actual profits and pt
f is the forecast at each date t.  The bias test is simple and sensible:  over
a long sample period, you’d expect a to be close to zero and b to be close to one.  When we estimate
this equation, we get the following results:
pt = 1.380 + 0.949 pt
f, R2 = 0.21, D.W. = 0.17, F = .23, F* = 3.37,
(2.15) (0.216)
where R2 is the adjusted R2 statistic,  D.W. is the Durbin-Watson statistic, numbers in parentheses are
standard errors, F is the value of the test statistic for the joint hypothesis that a is zero and b is one, and
F* is the critical value of that statistic.  Since F < F*, we don’t reject the null hypothesis.
Sign Test.  If a forecast is optimal, the forecast errors should be independent with a zero median.
The sign test examines this null hypothesis by examining the number of positive forecast errors in the
sample, which has a binomial distribution.  Since the studentized version of the statistic is standard
normal, we assess its significance with the normal distribution.  The test statistic has a value of 0.56,
less than the critical value of 1.96, so we don’t reject the null hypothesis that the forecast errors have
zero median.
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test.  The Wilcoxon signed-rank test is related to the sign test, since it has
the same null hypothesis, but requires distributional symmetry.  It accounts for the relative sizes of
the forecast errors, not just their sign.  The test statistic is the sum of the ranks of the absolute values
of the positive forecast errors, where the forecast errors are ranked in increasing order.  The studentized
value of the statistic is normally distributed.  The test statistic has a value of 0.07, while the critical value
is 1.96, so we don’t reject the null hypothesis.
Zero-Mean Test.  Optimal forecasts should pass a simple test:  the mean of the forecast errors
should be zero.  The mean of the forecast errors divided by its standard error is 0.64, which is less than
the critical value of 2.04, so we don’t reject the null hypothesis that the mean of the forecast errors is
zero.
Dufour Test.  Dufour adapts the Wilcoxon signed-rank test and applies it to the product of succes-
sive forecast errors.  This is a stringent test of the hypothesis that the forecast errors are white noise
and serially independent, in particular that they are symmetric about zero.  The value of the test
statistic is 1.32, less than the critical value of 1.96, thus we don’t reject the null hypothesis that forecast
errors are white noise.
_
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